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Migration policy in Germany today is better than its 
reputation would suggest. It has improved considerably 
over the last 20 years, though it has suffered setbacks 
and contradictions in the process. The improvements 
made have been driven less by a commitment to making 
migration policy “fit for the future” than by the need to 
respond to a changing reality. In addition, Germany’s 
integration into the European Union also positively af-
fected domestic realities of integration, which has sown 
the terrain for a more effective migration policy con-
cept. Nonetheless, instead of tackling problems direct-
ly, the migration policy debate in Germany continues 
to languish under self-critical navel-gazing. As a result, 
migration policy in Germany fails to seize present op-
portunities and – even worse – live up to Germany’s 
self-proclaimed standards as a modern, pluralistic soci-
ety at the heart of Europe. A forward-looking migration 
policy that anticipates challenges rather than a back-
ward-looking, ad hoc approach to policymaking is part 
and parcel of such standards. Indeed, to date, Germany 
has failed to embed migration policy within a fully co-
herent strategic framework. 
Implementing a migration architecture of this nature 
is an ambitious undertaking that must be underpinned 
by a structurally sound, carefully planned and strategic 
approach. It demands not only clearly defined objec-
tives, but also clearly defined paths toward these goals. 
This contribution reviews the course of past migration 
policy changes in Germany, outlines action areas for 
comprehensive migration reform and identifies the key 
elements of implementing such a reform. It was origi-
nally published in “ReformKompass Migration” (2014, 
“Migration ReformCompass – Managing Immigration, 
Participation and a Culture of Welcome”) and has been 
updated for the English translation. 
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INTRODUCTION
The case of Germany’s 2005 immigration reform illus-
trates the difficulty of policymaking, in particular when 
it has a broad substantive reach and involves the voices 
of many different actors. It also illustrates the extent to 
which the process goes beyond policy formulation to in-
clude questions of who ultimately has the power to in-
terpret meaning in the public sphere. At the end of the 
day, policy outcomes often differ from the original in-
tent of reform initiators, which ushers in a new period of 
readjustments. For example, the 2000 Citizenship Law 
(Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz) continues to be the focus of 
political disputes and immigration legislation. In fact, in 
spite of a completed “reform,” immigration policy is still 
subject to change today. 
Each new government constellation represents the 
promise of a new beginning, especially if it has a con-
siderable parliamentary majority, as the current Ger-
man government does. Individual political actors will 
almost certainly differ in their response to the question 
as to whether migration reform is necessary. As long as 
the distribution of institutional and political competenc-
es for migration policy (i.e., immigration, integration, 
inclusion and citizenship) in Germany remains frag-
mented, and as long as migration policy is repeatedly 
modified in response to each new political climate, the 
mere idea of working on comprehensive reform as part 
of a coordinated migration policy is a sign of progress. 
This contribution seeks to develop this idea further 
by outlining a possible migration reform in the context 
of Germany’s current political constellation and from 
the perspective of the government. Migration reform 
will be approached from three different vantage points: 
qualitative policy analysis, professional migration ex-
pertise and practical policy advice. All three levels are 
important in determining the goals, implementation 
methods and public communication involved in pursu-
ing reform. The template used in planning this reform 
On December 17, 2013, the cabinet of Germany’s most 
recent grand coalition government, which consists of 
the Christian Democrats (CDU with the Bavarian CSU) 
and the Social Democrats (SPD), was sworn in. The co-
alition enjoys a majority of 504 of 631 seats in the Bun-
destag. Although they are eight votes shy of a simple 
majority in the Bundesrat (Federal Council, Germany’s 
upper house), a deal with the Greens would enable 
them to achieve a two-thirds majority there (as of Janu-
ary 2015). This is a comfortable position from which to 
shape policy and set a firm course of action in complex 
policy areas. This is important because a common poli-
cy pursued by the grand coalition in controversial areas 
could potentially achieve a broader social consensus 
than could decisions made by a government originat-
ing from one specific political camp. This is particularly 
true for migration policy issues. 
In the past 20 years, all major decisions with regard 
to migration policy were brokered between the ruling 
government and opposition parties, with both sides pre-
senting competing views of society. For the most part, 
negotiations took place within the context of standard 
parliamentary procedures. Occasionally, however, these 
negotiations were also conducted acrimoniously in the 
public sphere. No doubt the most striking example of 
this was the planned reform of the Immigration Act in 
2001/2002 by the then SPD-Greens coalition govern-
ment: The reform failed in the Bundesrat and had to be 
renegotiated afterward with the opposition CDU/CSU 
and Free Democratic (FDP) parties before coming into 
force in 2005. This era also marked the apex of political 
polarization within Germany on the issue of migration 
policy. And though political conflicts over the subject of 
migration are still present today, the general tone has 
changed. Indeed, migration policy – once a proxy for 
social battles – has increasingly become the focus of 
outcome-oriented, albeit slow-paced policymaking. 
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is the “ReformCompass – The Strategy Instrument,” a 
tool for understanding reform processes created by the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung. The ReformCompass allows pol-
icymakers to plan policymaking processes in advance 
and/or analyze their impact after the fact. The reform 
process is divided into five fields of action: strategic core 
group, agenda setting, formulating and decision mak-
ing, implementation and ongoing impact evaluation. 
Further information on each facet of this instrument 
can be found at www.ReformCompass.de.
Reform projects as complicated as migration policy 
are generally difficult to control. This has in large part 
to do with the presence of conditions that reform actors 
cannot influence directly. As mentioned above, the cur-
rent majorities are a good starting point for significant 
migration reform. Nevertheless, successfully imple-
menting migration reform is a very difficult task. Every 
individual reform must be underpinned by a substan-
tive logic that sets goals and maps out the best route 
to achieving those goals. However, at every stage in the 
process, individual decision-makers can influence the 
nature of individual reform steps and their outcomes. 
This is true regardless of whether we’re dealing with 
the logic of administrative functions, financing, political 
parties or federalism. None of this can be determined 
in advance, nor can it be taken fully into account when 
planning reform. It should be noted, however, that this 
dynamic also relieves reform actors from the burden (or 
idealized notion) of being required to have in advance 
answers to all reform issues and challenges.
A blackbox of uncertainties such as this does not 
necessarily mean the idea of planning reform is futile. 
It simply highlights the need for a roadmap, without 
which the reform is doomed to fail before it even gets 
underway. Proposing a possible roadmap for such an 
undertaking, this outline is intended as a planning aid 
and, alternatively, as food for thought. It remains the re-
sponsibility of policymakers, however, to tread the path 
toward a modern migration policy and thus overcome 
existing uncertainties. 
THE REFORM OUTLINE IS DIVIDED AS 
FOLLOWS:
Section 1 (The long path from “guest workers” to a wel-
coming culture) examines legislative changes in the 
past 20 years in order to identify patterns and their or-
igins in the ongoing development of German migration 
policy. This knowledge serves to contextualize the re-
form outline and its content and processes. 
Section 2 (Migration policy scenarios: What does the 
future hold?) sheds light on the domestic actors and 
factors influencing migration reform and potential tra-
jectories in migration policy. This section presents the 
most probable development scenario as well as best and 
worst case scenarios resulting from the logic of compre-
hensive migration policy. The best case then serves as 
the reform objective targeted in this outline. 
Section 3 (The contents of reform: Making concrete 
progress in migration) illustrates the necessary ele-
ments involved in formulating a successful reform ob-
jective: It must be concrete, verifiable and articulated 
in terms of individual steps. These elements provide 
the basis in formulating the reform outline’s ultimate 
goal, which is to increase the number of skilled workers 
coming to Germany from third countries in a sustaina-
ble manner over the long term. This will be followed by 
suggestions with regard to the content of a well-thought-
through migration reform in which each individual step 
involves progress toward the reform’s objective. 
Sections 4 to 8 move step-by-step through a potential 
migration reform in keeping with the ReformCompass. 
Each section examines a different element, including 
the composition of the reform steering group, the agen-
da framing the reform, the internal clearance and re-
view of the reform objective, how to communicate and 
profile the reform project, the practical implementation 
of individual reform steps and the ongoing monitoring 
of progress.
Section 9 (Conclusion: A migration policy for Germa-
ny’s future) summarizes those findings that are signifi-
cant for the success of migration reform.
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1. THE LONG PATH FROM “GUEST WORKERS”  
TO A WELCOMING CULTURE 
lenges and pacify the ideological battles carried out in 
the policy area. In fact, Germany’s political reality with 
regard to migration policy lies most often between these 
two poles. Indeed, the 2005 immigration reform was the 
last attempt to carry out a large-scale reform in this area 
(see box). 
Based on the information contained in Table 1, the 
following statements can be made with regard to the de-
velopment of German migration policy:
 · In general, the trend has moved toward facilitating 
immigration and immigrant access to labor markets, 
strengthening immigrant rights and improving the 
situation of refugees. This has not been a linear de-
velopment; the process has been interrupted by re-
peated setbacks and reflects more accurately a pro-
cess of “two steps forward, one step back.” 
 · Each major legislative change (to foreigners act, 
citizenship law, immigration law, etc.) reflects both 
liberalization and restriction elements. This under-
scores the fundamental ambivalence of German 
migration policy by modifying individual elements 
but resisting changes to the status quo or revising in 
favor of a comprehensive concept. The motto of the 
Immigration Act, which is “Support and Demand” 
(“Fördern und Fordern”), is representative of this ap-
proach in migration legislation. 
 · Many of the key decisions facilitating migration can 
be traced back to EU guidelines, many of which are 
anchored in the principle of the free movement of 
individuals. Both the General Equal Treatment Law 
(AGG) and the EU Blue Card for foreign skilled work-
ers mark migration policy achievements that could 
never have been implemented in this form – for rea-
sons of domestic politics – had Germany not been a 
member of the EU. Opposition to the introduction of 
the AGG and the longest European-wide transitional 
period for the free movement of Eastern European EU 
Our perception of political events is always selective – 
especially in hindsight. Much of what goes on in politics 
takes place covertly: Sometimes the accompanying rhet-
oric is more prominent than the actual impact of plans 
or, in contrast, ostensibly insignificant changes end up 
having tangible effects on the persons concerned. If 
asked to identify the major “turning points” in German 
migration policy, experts, journalists and citizens would 
most likely name those events they remember best: for 
example, the asylum compromise of 1992, the new citi-
zenship law of 2000 or the immigration reform of 2005. 
It’s also possible they might only remember the last ma-
jor public debate or the most recent legislative change. 
Indeed, it is hard to keep track of the many changes 
taking place in migration policy; even if we could, it is 
doubtful this would play much of a role in the public 
perception of migration. However, we must look at the 
big picture in order to identify recurring patterns in the 
changes made to policies and to trace the route taken to 
date by German policymakers in their understanding of 
migration policy.
The overview contained in Table 1 presents a se-
lection of legislative changes in Germany’s migration 
policy over the past several decades, thus providing an 
abbreviated representation of the country’s “history of 
reform.” The table shows that despite the introduction 
of various reforms since the early 1990s, migration pol-
icy has been a long-winded “work in progress,” and not 
the sum of a few individual milestones. This approach 
has benefits, as it provides opportunities to effectively 
monitor the success of each individual reform. Nonethe-
less, the entire endeavor often leads to the opposite of 
what it intended to be. It becomes a fundamentally ad 
hoc process in which actors react and adjust to exter-
nal events and current policy debates often subject to 
irrational claims. In contrast, there is also the ideal of a 




already been set up and had, in its first annual report, rec-
ommended an immigration quota of 25,000 people (“Wir 
brauchen 25.000 qualifizierte Zuwanderer” 2004). In the 
end, the attempt to achieve comprehensive reform failed 
due to a combination of external factors (security concerns), 
the challenge of effectively communicating the idea of pro-
moting immigration in an era of high unemployment rates, 
and the ideological instrumentalization of the subject by the 
opposition.
In 2000, the German government established the Inde-
pendent Immigration Commission (“Süssmuth Commis-
sion”) in an attempt to connect external expertise with 
effective public communication and to develop proposals 
for a fundamental reform of the country’s migration policy. 
The commission’s task was to determine the actual need for 
immigration, to develop the means by which to manage and 
limit immigration and to develop an overarching integration 
concept. In 2001, the commission delivered its final report, 
which foresaw a general liberalization and, among other 
things, called for a coherent migration policy with clearly 
formulated goals. In addition, it called on the legislature to 
create a permanent “immigration council” (as an advisory 
council to the government) and to merge the coordination 
of migration in the hands of the Federal Office for Migra-
tion and Refugees (Bericht der Unabhängigen Kommission 
“Zuwanderung”2001). Different substantive points were 
incorporated into the subsequent Immigration Law of 2005, 
while others – in particular the structural and overall policy 
proposals – remained sidelined. There are many reasons for 
this, including the following:
1) For general security reasons and in light of the ter-
ror attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States, 
the then Minister of the Interior Otto Schily (SPD) tightened 
Germany’s immigration law (Amann 2001). 2) Structural 
questions are automatically also questions of power, and it 
is highly unlikely that a German federal minister would vol-
untarily relinquish power over migration policy, especially if 
it involved giving that power up to a subordinate office. 3) 
Many suggestions fell victim to ideological squabbles with 
the then parliamentary opposition. The reaction from the 
CDU/CSU with regard to the Süssmuth Commission’s final 
report was along the following lines: “The recommenda-
tions did not reflect a concept that limited immigration, but 
rather one that expanded immigration” (“Süssmuth überg-
ibt Zuwanderungsbericht” 2001); they even noted that the 
report discussed immigration in a positive light “for purely 
demographic reasons […]” (ibid.). As a result, much was 
removed in the subsequent mediation committee, including 
the Expert Council on Migration and Integration (“Das Zu-
wanderungsgesetz und seine Geschichte” 2009), which had 
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Table 1: Overview of select legislative changes in migration policy
Liberalization and restriction in immigration, labor market access, naturalization, asylum, religious freedom and equal treatment policies: 
1953 The Federal Law on Refugees and Exiles (Bundesvertriebenengesetz) regulates the immigration, 
naturalization and care of refugees and exiles of German ethnicity (Aussiedler).
1955 –1968 Labor recruitment agreements with Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, South Korea, Portugal, 
Tunisia and Yugoslavia.
1973 Introduction of a recruitment ban on foreign labor migration from the so-called “guest worker” 
countries.
1991 Revised version of the Foreigners Act (Ausländergesetz): 
Introduction of a minimum of 15 years (or six years of school education) for naturalization 
with simultaneous claim to naturalization “as a rule” (Regelanspruch). Elimination of language 
requirement for the purpose of naturalization. Introduction of exceptions to the previous recruit-
ment ban (Anwerbestoppausnahmeverordnung). Individuals with Jewish heritage permitted to 
emigrate from CIS states as quota refugees.
1992 Revised version of the Asylum Procedure Law (Asylum Compromise) and introduction of the 
principle of safe third countries and countries of origin (refugees cannot apply for asylum when 
they have entered Germany via a safe third country)
1993 Reduction of the naturalization fee from 5,000 DM (or 75% of monthly income) to 500 DM. 
Conversion of the claim to naturalization “as a rule” (Regelanspruch) into a legal claim  
(Rechtsanspruch) with regard to the conditions for naturalization.
1993 Introduction of the freedom of movement (freedom of establishment and freedom of movement 
for workers) for EU citizens as part of the basic freedoms of the European Union.
1997 Tightening of the required language skills for immigrants of German ethnicity (Aussiedler).
2000 New Citizenship Law: 
Reduction of the minimum duration of stay for naturalization from 15 to 8 years. Introduction of 
the birthplace principle connected to the “option obligation” which requires persons with dual 
citizenship to choose one citizenship upon reaching the age of 23 (Optionspflicht). Expatriation 
due to secret or subsequent multiple citizenships is now possible. Re-introduction of sufficient 
language skills as a condition for naturalization.
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Source: Thränhardt 1999, Butterwegge 2005, Schneider 2007,  
Storz and Wilmes 2007, Federal Government 2010 and author’s own research
2000 Introduction of a Greencard entry program for IT specialists (applied until 2004).
2004 Several Länder (German federal states) enact a ban on headscarves for female teachers at public 
schools.
2005 New immigration law: 
Simplification of residency permit (merging two permits into one). A new employment regulation 
brings together all forms of labor migration. Extension of the duration of stay for foreign univer-
sity graduates looking for employment from 6 to 12 months. Introduction of a Hardship Com-
mission for foreign nationals obliged to leave the country. Introduction of mandatory integration 
courses (language and orientation course) for certain groups of migrants. The immigration of 
people with Jewish heritage from CIS states is made more difficult.
2006 Introduction of the General Equal Treatment Act (AGG or Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz) 
(implementation of an EU guideline).
2007 Changes to the Immigration Act: Tightening the rules governing the subsequent immigration  
of family members. Increasing the limit on committed crimes that prevent naturalization. The 
immigration of people with Jewish heritage from CIS states is governed by a new point system.
2008 Introduction of a citizenship test.
2010 The freedom of movement of citizens from Eastern European states that joined the EU in 2004 
comes into effect.
2012 Introduction of the “EU Blue Card” as a simplified form of immigration for skilled foreign work-
ers parallel to the existing law (implementation of an EU guideline). Further extension of the 
duration of stay permitted to foreign university graduates looking for employment to18 months. 
Easing the official recognition of foreign professional qualifications.
2014 Modification of option obligation (maintaining dual citizenship becomes easier for people born 
in Germany). Relief for asylum seekers (no mandatory residency area requirement, faster access 
to labor market, shorter processing times, no so-called “toleration chain”) and classification of 
several Balkan states as safe third countries. The freedom of movement of citizens from Bulgaria 
and Rumania comes into effect.
10
ReformCompass Migration
citizens seeking employment are both expressions 
of the power of these forces (Preuß 2010; Fraczek 
2014). Without the deepening of integration pushed 
forward by the European Union, Germany’s migra-
tion policy record would be far less positive. Indeed, 
the steady guideline-oriented work of the European 
Commission brought about a de facto harmonization, 
even though the EU government and heads of state 
hadn’t foreseen this effect explicitly in the area of 
migration (Ghelli 2014).
Although the migration debate of the past two decades 
has focused more on people from North Africa, Turkey 
and the Balkans, as well as on refugees more gener-
ally, immigration to Germany since the beginning of 
the 2000s was in fact a direct result of the freedom of 
movement of individuals within Europe. In this sense, 
since 2005, an average of two-thirds of net migration 
by individuals without German citizenship originates 
from EU nations (see Table 2). The absolute numbers 
have increased as a result of the current financial crisis. 
However, the large percentage of EU migration within 
the context of overall migration to Germany has re-
mained roughly the same (Federal Office of Statistics, 
2013, 2014). The largest share of EU immigrants to Ger-
many over the past decade originate from Southern and 
Eastern Europe. 
Despite the overall increase in immigration, which 
some parts of the public perceive as a threat, the 
absolute numbers continue to pose no problem for 
Germany – a country with more than 80 million inhab-
itants – in terms of absorbing these new immigrants. 
Indeed, it is the very essence of European openness that 
this immigration (i.e., inner-European mobility) cannot 
be controlled and is subject to strong fluctuations. For 
this reason, it is very important – especially for Germa-
ny – to apply a uniform nationwide migration policy 
that contains comprehensive settlement services for 
all immigrant groups. Doing so will allow Germany to 
better handle immigration surges that occur at certain 
times and/or in certain regions. 
The effects of European integration as well as in-
ternational political events have been instrumental in 
shaping German migration policy. Whereas the 1973 
oil crisis brought an end to Germany’s recruitment of 
“guest workers” policy, the civil war in former Yugosla-
via prompted a change in its asylum policy. Later, in 
the 1990s, the collapse of the eastern bloc led to an in-
flux of ethnic Germans and Jewish refugees. And like 
many other governments, the German government has 
responded to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 by mixing mi-
gration policy with security policy. In fact, the current 
debate over internal migration within the EU is driven 
in large part by Europe’s financial crisis.
In politics, effective countermeasures are usually in-
troduced only once an acute need has been established. 
In migration policy, this has resulted in several initially 
sensible decisions being made that do not reflect long-
term planning and often contradict other measures. Ex-
panding settlement services for one immigrant group 
while resources for another are cut is just one exam-
ple. This kind of ad hoc policymaking can also result 
in measures that are counter-productive in the medium 
term. Deterrence policies targeting first-generation im-
migrants, for example, can ultimately render integra-
tion more difficult for dependents and later generations.
And though we’ve touched upon a variety of factors 
influencing  Germany’s migration policy in the last 
30 years, we’ve not yet mentioned party politics, elec-
toral strategies and political ideology. On balance, the 
accomplishments of the German Bundestag on migra-
tion policy are positive. But what about public debates 
on migration? Developments here run similar to those 
seen with legislation: Both support for diversity and 
opposition to migration have generated mixed results. 
Overall, however, we’ve seen among Germans (i.e., the 
receiving society) a growing acceptance of diversity and 
sense of responsibility for the success of integration. 
The question as to whether laws are created in re-
sponse to public debates or public debates influence 
legislative plans is the subject of ongoing debate among 
political scientists. The interplay between public debate 
and policymaking is intense, and much depends on the 
skills (and intentions) of individual politicians. In Ger-
many, despite several years of skepticism regarding im-
migration, the fact that the idea of a welcoming culture 
has permeated public discourse more thoroughly than 
that of a leading national culture (Leitkultur) can be ex-
plained by a simple social reality: We live in ethnic and 
religious diversity; a truly solution-oriented policy must 
therefore accommodate this diversity.
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Table 2: Net migration to Germany of non-German nationals  
from elsewhere in the EU 2004–2014
Year Net migration 
(from other EU states)
Total net migration 
(from anywhere)
EU migrants as a percentage 
of net migration 
2014 (first half) 170,816 283,250 60.3%
2013 303,893 459,160 66.2%
2012 275,476 387,149 71.2%
2011 215,725 302,858 71.2%
2010 99,010 153,925 64.3%
2009 18,156 27,506 66%
2008 11,695 10,685 109.4%*
2007 73,261 99,003 74%
2006 61,644 74,693 82.5%
2005 60,944 95,717 63.7%
2004 13,494 55,217 24.4%
 
Net migration refers here to the difference between immigration (i.e., people moving to Germany) and emigration  
(i.e., people leaving Germany); 2004–2006: EU25, 2007–2012: EU27
* The net migration balance of non-EU nationals for 2008 was negative
Source: German Federal Statistics Office (Destatis) 2013, 2014, BAMF 2014, author’s own calculations.
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2. MIGRATION POLICY SCENARIOS:  
WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?
 · Employers and trade associations which, given cur-
rent and projected skilled labor needs, have an in-
terest in expanding and simplifying immigration, 
whether this applies to skilled workers with a uni-
versity degree or vocational training (e.g., industry 
or nursing) or unskilled workers (e.g., agriculture, 
service sector, construction). Employers and trade 
associations have particular relevance for the is-
sue of migration regulation. Normally, labor unions 
also play a role here, and their consensus is sought 
through the social partnership framework. 
 · Parties at the Länder and national levels seek atten-
tion, votes and Deutungshoheit (which is what you 
have when your interpretation or framing of events 
is broadly accepted as fact) by stating their position 
on migration (this is true irrespective of whether 
they are for or against it; for a detailed analysis, see 
Kösemen 2014). But normative aspects such as equal 
treatment, lifestyles or social cohesion also play a 
role here and are manifest in the issues of citizen-
ship and anti-discrimination. Though more diffuse 
as a factor, party politics have more influence than 
the first two factors because party politics play (in-
directly) an immense role in formulating and imple-
menting legislation as party members generally sit 
at the top of government administrative offices and 
agencies. Party politics also play a key role in deter-
mining public agendas, although NGOs and other 
civil society actors work together with opinion mak-
ers to influence discussions within parties. 
Now-common references to a welcoming culture refer 
not to an explicit structural or legislative feature of 
migration policy but, rather, to the idea that the imple-
mentation of migration policy should be driven by good 
will and not obstructed by reluctance. Simply stated, it’s 
a matter of providing customer services for the target 
Predictions in politics are always difficult as the course 
of past developments is not always destined to contin-
ue into the future, particularly given the incalculable 
nature of external factors and day-to-day politics. It is 
nonetheless useful to develop scenarios as this can help 
anticipate the effects of potential developments and 
thus define reform needs in migration policy. Scenari-
os help those engaged in policymaking answer the fol-
lowing questions: Which development is likely to take 
place? What impact will this have on my interests? And 
where should I take action in order to mitigate the neg-
ative effects of likely developments?
In addition to the two aforementioned external fac-
tors (international events and the deepening of EU inte-
gration) there are three groups of relevant actors with 
corresponding interests that represent driving factors 
in German domestic politics and shape the country’s 
migration policy:
 · Municipalities and cities in need of pragmatic solu-
tions tailored to their local needs, and which therefore 
act accordingly. This is true in particular with regard 
to the complex issue of settlement services (language 
courses, orientation support, job placement, social 
services, access to education, sensitivity training for 
handling migrant customers of municipal services, 
recognition of foreign certificates, etc.). In the last 
ten years, increasingly more municipalities have rec-
ognized the need to develop locally a comprehensive 
and participatory approach to integration policy in or-
der to meet the cross-cutting demands brought forth 
by migration and integration. These proven solutions 
eventually find their way to the regional or Länder-lev-
el of policymaking. Eventually, some approaches 
(or aspects thereof) find their way into the national 
framework legislation – independent of the political 
constellation and regional actors’ political clout. Often 
these issues are related to financing. 
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group of migrants with specific needs. The concept of a 
welcoming culture can therefore find its way into each, 
some or none of the aforementioned factors, irrespec-
tive of the individual actor and his or her concept of 
migration policy.
Table 3 presents three potential scenarios regarding 
key elements of migration policy (settlement services, 
migration regulation, citizenship and anti-discrimina-
tion). The first and most probable scenario draws on mi-
gration policy developments observed in Germany over 
the last 20 years (as outlined in Table 1). It represents 
a slow trend toward liberalization that nonetheless fea-
tures thematic gaps and exceptions to the rule in policy 
contents. Titled “fragmented ad hoc policymaking” it 
could also be referred to as “muddling through.” The 
second “ideal solution” scenario involves a comprehen-
sive overhaul of migration policy in which all actors are 
targeting the same objective in a consistent manner 
(best case). The third “setback” scenario assumes that 
as a result of certain events or political constellations 
the migration debate takes a turn for the worse, which 
has a negative impact on migration policy (worst case). 
What are the consequences of these scenarios with 
respect to reform needs in Germany? None of these 
three scenarios would spell the end of migration policy, 
but they do involve different results. In migration policy 
there are so-called hard (i.e., quantifiable) determinants 
such as immigration figures, naturalization figures, 
retention quotas among foreign-born university gradu-
ates, the duration of stay of immigrants, quotas for the 
subsequent immigration of family members, the per-
centage of positions in so-called bottleneck occupations 
that are filled by foreign skilled workers, and equality 
of opportunity in accessing education and jobs. There 
are also so-called soft (i.e., qualitative) determinants 
such as a sense of belonging, participation in public 
life, demonstrating commitment to civil society, a sense 
of identification with Germany and perceptions of in-
clusion or exclusion. We can assume that in the first 
scenario, several of these determinants change little 
or improve somewhat; in the second scenario, they im-
prove palpably; and in the third scenario, they worsen 
appreciably.
The remainder of this reform outline draws upon 
the second scenario (best case with regard to a compre-
hensive migration policy) as a desired reform outcome 
because it promises to deliver stronger improvements 
for more determinants in migration policy than would 
the other two scenarios. This is consistent with our be-
lief that approaches marked by ad hoc and situationally 
dependent decision making cannot generate signifi-
cant changes with broad reach because the migration 
policy area itself is heavily fragmented with regard to 
decision making and its contents and implementation. 
Furthermore, comprehensive reform is the only means 
of ensuring sustainable positive effects for the long 
term in a policy field. It also delivers what we would 
expect of a progressive migration reform: ensuring the 
attractiveness and openness of a country of immigra-
tion, managing immigration fairly for migrants and the 
recipient culture and providing all citizens – regardless 
of their background – equality of opportunity as well 








“Fragmented ad hoc policymaking”: Changes made to the status quo will be obstructed by 
veto players and control mechanisms or exceptions to the rule that speak to specific interests will 
be introduced into migration policy. The principle of a transparent and straightforward migration 
regulation will be dropped and its necessity contested. Nobody wants to bear the costs of estab-
lishing a comprehensive system of settlement services. Fragmented regional solutions are developed 
that differ considerably in reach and impact. In response to urgent labor market demands, the EU 
Blue Card is taken up as a fast-track solution and expanded in parallel with existing legislation. It 
is accompanied by limited settlement services (and only for specific immigrant groups) in selected 
regions. Changes to citizenship and anti-discrimination legislation and practices are minor.
Scenario 2
Best case with regard 
to a comprehensive 
migration policy
“Ideal solution”: Migration regulation is subject to a complete overhaul in order to take full 
advantage of and improve Germany’s economic situation. Veto players are incorporated within the 
process and compensated. The legal framework is redefined and long-term settlement is articulated 
as an objective of future immigration. Dual citizenship without any exceptions is introduced. Actors 
at the regional and Länder level reach agreement on establishing consistent settlement services that 
are properly financed. Participating parties communicate the positive social and economic effects of 
a modern immigration policy and expanded anti-discrimination measures. 
Scenario 3 
Worst case with 
regard to a compre-
hensive migration 
policy
“Setback”: Political activity with regard to migration regulation remains primarily symbolic in na-
ture and fails to move beyond emotional appeals. The term “welcoming culture” becomes an empty 
phrase and loses meaning the more actors refer to it without taking substantive action. Following 
the propagation of an initially loose interpretation of migration regulation, the pendulum swings 
back in response to external shock factors or the instrumentalization of supposed poverty-driven 
immigration or the fear of foreign cultural domination for specific political goals. This results in a 
considerable setback, taking migration regulation back to a state behind that of the current status 
quo. Settlement services remain an exception; inner-EU migration, thanks to EU legislation, remains 
possible but becomes more difficult as a result of additional regulations; attempts to gain citizen-
ship are handled with less good will; and little more than lip service is paid to equality policies. 
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3. THE CONTENTS OF REFORM:  
MAKING CONCRETE PROGRESS IN MIGRATION
geted groups should understand the changes they face 
and what opportunities the reform will provide. All of 
these factors play a role in the various phases of reform 
implementation.
In this reform outline, we’ve identified increasing 
skilled worker immigration as a main goal. The reasons 
for this include: 
 · Demographic change and Germany’s growing need 
for skilled workers have been matters of public de-
bate for a while now.
 · Skilled worker immigration represents primarily an 
economic benefit and is therefore associated with a 
positive development; the advantages this has for 
wealth creation (or for preventing the loss of wealth) 
is in principle of benefit to society more generally. 
 · Employers’ associations comprise a well-organised 
interest group that has already begun advocating 
such reform and is very influential among conserva-
tive political groups critical of migration.
 · Current migration regulation standards established 
by the EU Blue Card have had no noteworthy impact 
because although they have lowered legal hurdles to 
immigration, they have failed to improve administra-
tive and societal conditions (“Die Blue Card ist ein 
Flop” 2014).
 · The current influx of inner-EU migration from south-
ern Europe is driven by the current economic crisis 
and therefore temporary. Given similar demographic 
issues in southern Europe, this solution is not tena-
ble beyond the medium term. 
 · It is a goal that all actors in Germany’s federal gov-
ernment can agree upon. 
Finally, this reform objective is also tactical. The argu-
ment for skilled worker immigration is clearly based in 
large part on economic necessity. However, the set of 
regulations and structures that would be established in 
A broadly conceived and comprehensive migration re-
form comes closest to reaching the goal of improving 
the determinants identified at the end of Section 2. The 
point here is not only to bring general improvements to 
all those areas related to migration (e.g., labor market, 
demographics, education, political participation) but 
also to overcome the problem of protracted and recur-
rent legislative tinkering. The constant readjustments 
made to migration policy in recent years have rightfully 
warranted references to a “permanent construction site” 
or political “rearguard battles” being waged.
A reform’s rationale and its formulated objectives are 
inextricably linked to each other. They are conceived, 
planned and formulated together, often in alternation 
with each other. The difference between broad political 
declarations and the communication of a reform vision 
should lie in the clarity of targeted objectives. Strength-
ening a culture of welcome is not a reform objective. 
It is, at best, a consequence of successful reform. The 
same is true of “improving the integration of migrants” 
or “creating participation opportunities for migrants.” 
These statements are purposefully vague. And this 
vagueness allows them to resonate among both critics 
and supporters of an active migration policy. It also 
makes them less susceptible to calls for verification.
Calls to increase “the percentage of college-bound 
migrants,” “retention rates among foreign-born sec-
ondary school graduates” or “the number of immigrant 
skilled workers” are, by contrast, more appropriate be-
cause they can be tracked and verified, and therefore 
promote accountability with regard to reform goals. 
Poorly defined objectives lead to ineffectual outcomes. 
A key reform objective should therefore be concrete, 
verifiable and potentially broken down into individual 
steps (for the purpose of taking corrective measures 
but also for achieving medium-term goals). Participants 






Increasing skilled worker immigration 


























Merge currently parallel EU Blue 
Card and German employment 
regulations into one set of rules 
and regulations.
Introduce elements of a point 
system to manage immigration.
Ensure the clear communication 
of immigration rules and 
regulations abroad. Provide 
a public point calculator for 
all types of immigration 
(highly skilled immigration, 
bottleneck occupations, education, 
temporary stays).
Make it easier for families 
to reunite and ease restrictions 
on visitation visas for 
family members.
Strengthen and expand 
anti-discrimination measures 
and provide the resources 
needed to ensure these 
measures are implemented.
Expedite and make easier 
the process of naturalization 
and promote a general 
acceptance of dual citizenship.
Structurally 
anchor a culture 
of welcome and 
recognition
Establish settlement services 
across the country (language and 
integration courses, orientation 
support, bureaucracy guides, 
recognition of qualiﬁcations) 
that target the needs of 
immigrants.
Place settlement and other 
immigration-related services 
under one “welcome” 
or “citizens’” center roof. 
Open settlement services to all 
immigrants (refugees, students, 
family members).
Establish consistent 
standards for settlement 
services throughout the 
country (quality and reach of 
offerings) which are properly 
ﬁnanced and held accountable for 
the services they provide.
Figure 1: Goal pyramid for migration reform
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order to achieve intermediate and action goals would 
create benefits for all migrants in Germany – that is, 
not only future skilled workers, but also those migrants 
already living in Germany with or without qualifica-
tions and irrespective of whether they arrived through 
familial relations, internal EU migration or as refugees. 
More can be achieved by focusing on the utility argu-
ment than can appeals to humanitarian or sociopolitical 
concerns which generally generate greater resistance 
among migration skeptics.
The goal pyramid (Figure 1) lays out the details of 
a skilled worker immigration reform objective, includ-
ing intermediate goals (i.e., the general requirements 
in various areas of migration policy) and the necessary 
action goals (i.e., measures explicitly needed in order to 
achieve the intermediate goals). 
Clearly, the action goals for a reform of this nature 
require fine-tuning and must be filled with concrete 
actions to be taken by individual administrative bodies 
and agencies at each level of government. Information 
at this level of detail lies beyond the scope of this con-
tribution. Furthermore, these activities are a product of 
negotiation processes among the agents of reform and 
should not be determined in advance. The goal pyramid 
serves to illustrate the wealth of aspects to consider in 
migration reform and their capacity to bring about gen-
uine broad-based change. 
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4. THE STRATEGIC CORE GROUP:  
ACTORS DRIVING MIGRATION REFORM IN THE 
GRAND COALITION
The strategic core group – or strategy group – is com-
prised primarily of those individuals standing at the core 
of a reform. They hold all the strings and are the motor 
driving reform forward. They should agree on the basic 
objectives of the reform and act as a voice and convincing 
advocate of reform both internally (within their party or 
parliamentary group) and externally (vis-á-vis interest or-
ganizations, the public). Internal and external expertise 
is bundled within the strategy group, which determines 
the pace of reform, its communication and how to engage 
supporters and critics in the process. The constellation of 
personnel with regard to content and information, influ-
ence, maintaining a partisan balance and public credibil-
ity is important as these individuals must build support 
for the reform and be able to ensure follow-through on 
decisions made. Every reform runs the risk of being un-
dermined by obstructors, that is, individuals in the strat-
egy group who have been sent by influential veto players 
unable to prevent reform plans from getting underway 
and who aim to torpedo the reform in the medium term. It 
is therefore advisable to keep the group’s numbers small 
and to integrate and thereby mitigate the impact of those 
who might otherwise obstruct reform.
The current makeup of the German government 
is conducive to establishing a balanced strategy group. 
Led by two modern major parties, the government 
features a balance of ministers presiding over migra-
tion-related areas. The fact that the CSU no longer 
heads the Ministry of the Interior – a key ministry for 
migration policy – is an advantage in terms of formu-
lating and communicating a cohesive reform. Generally 
critical of immigration measures, the CSU as a party 
cannot credibly act as a driver of reform. Table 4 shows 
the distribution of legislative and operational tasks and 
competences in migration policy at the federal level. 
The number of federal ministries demonstrates the ex-
tent to which migration policy is a cross-cutting issue. 
There are, however, two key ministries: the Federal 
Ministry of the Interior (BMI or Bundesministerium des 
Innern) and the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs (BMAS or Bundesministerium für Arbeit und So-
ziales), each with their subordinate agencies, the Fed-
eral Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF or Bun-
desamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) and the Federal 
Employment Agency (BA or Bundesagentur für Arbeit). 
The ministers heading these two key ministries should 
therefore make up the core of the strategy group. The 
two subordinate agencies should provide internal ex-
pertise regarding the reform. The strategy group should 
also include representatives from the chancellor’s office 
and the office of the commissioner for migration, refu-
gees and integration (Beauftragter der Bundesregierung 
für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration). Maintain-
ing close relations with the chancellor is important not 
only to secure her political support during difficult mo-
ments but also as proof that she stands fully behind the 
reform. A strategy group based on this kind of quadrum-
virate would, under the current political circumstanc-
es, feature ministerial and partisan parity between the 
CDU and SPD. 
In addition to the strategy group and working com-
mittees from the BAMF and BA who prepare informa-
tion, another forum is required to bring together other 
non-central actors, such as the remaining ministers. 
This could take the form of a state secretary’s com-
mittee that meets on a regular basis and includes, in 
addition to representatives from the Ministries of the 
Interior and Labour and Social Affairs, those from other 
ministries listed in Table 4. A committee of this sort is 
relatively common. A temporary committee of this kind 
has already been established, for example, with regard 
to the issue of EU internal migration (BMAS 2014). To-
gether, these three areas (reform headquarters/strate-
gy group, internal expertise/BAMF-BA and ministerial 
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Table 4: The distribution of migration policy competences within the  
German federal government 
Relevant migration area Ministry and/or subordinate agency tasked with the issue
Citizenship Federal Ministry of the Interior, Federal Ministry of Justice
Entry and immigration regulation Federal Ministry of the Interior
Refugees and asylum-seekers Federal Ministry of the Interior, Federal Office for Migration and Refugees
Work and settlement permits Federal Ministry of the Interior, Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs, 
Federal Employment Agency
Job placement and vocational training Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs, Federal Employment Agency
Skilled labor immigration Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs, Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
Energy 
Settlement services Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 
Anti-discrimination Federal Ministry for Families, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth,  
Federal Anti-discrimination Agency
Urban development and neighborhood 
management
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation,  
Building and Nuclear Safety
Recognition of foreign qualifications Federal Ministry of Education and Research
German-language courses abroad (for 
family reunification)
Federal Foreign Office, Goethe-Institut
Visa issuance Federal Foreign Office, diplomatic missions/consular posts
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interaction/state secretaries’ committee) comprise the 
structural core of reform planning. 
In addition to determining the contents of reform 
and how to manage the reform process, the strategy 
group must also incorporate the input of supporters as 
well as critics. It is therefore important for members of 
the strategy group to pay close attention to their own 
party and parliamentary group (for the CDU this means 
the CDU/CSU parliamentary group) and stay informed 
of any resistance to the reform that might arise from 
within their party ranks. An early warning system of 
this sort should be considered by the party leadership 
and heads of each parliamentary group. 
In a pluralist federalist democracy such as Germa-
ny that features a cooperative political regime, it is im-
portant to involve many other actors in such a reform 
process. Temporary forums such as commissions, work-
ing groups, workshops or other forms of exchange and 
information dissemination come to mind here. These 
kinds of forums serve multiple purposes: NGOs, mi-
grant associations, universities and other institutes 
can contribute their expertise to the process; municipal 
umbrella organizations (e.g., the Association of German 
Cities), providers of social services and employees’ or 
employers’ associations can demonstrate a plurality of 
interests by voicing their expectations and needs. And 
finally, politically influential actors in the executive and 
legislative branches of government such as the Bundes-
rat or Länder-level governments must take the interests 
of their own party and parliamentary groups (including 
the CSU in the case of the CDU) as well as those of exist-
ing ministerial conferences (e.g., the Conference of In-
tegration and Interior Ministers) into consideration. The 
great challenge and task facing every strategy group 
is to accumulate as much support as possible without 
eroding the reform’s core content.
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5. AGENDA SETTING: THE PATH THROUGH THE 
IMMIGRATION-DEBATE MINEFIELD
reform process, as the outcome would in that case be 
purely symbolic politics. This risk is certainly present 
in the area of migration, as the reform issue not only af-
fects an exceptional number of other political areas, but 
can also trigger emotions that descend quickly into ran-
corous debate, conducted on the basis of solutions that 
are no more than platitudes. In the end, the outcome of 
reform must be something more substantial than mere 
slogans. Answering the following questions is crucial 
for the agenda-setting aspect of migration reform: 
HOW SHOULD THE REFORM BE FRAMED FROM 
BOTH A COMMUNICATIVE AND THEMATIC 
PERSPECTIVE (FRAMING)? 
The three scenarios in Table 3 show the range of possi-
ble developments in the field of migration policy. The 
goal of a reform should be to get as close as possible to 
the best-case scenario. The best case is not automatic, as 
political reality provides ample justification for all three 
scenarios, even and especially when the reform actors 
fail to achieve their own goals and must subsequent-
ly communicate the outcome of the reforms. A risk to 
every reform is that obstruction by one or more actors 
may lead to suboptimal results and yet, in the end, all 
participants praise the outcome in order to avoid having 
to admit failure. 
Framing is important in two respects: It serves as a 
guiding theme in convincing others and winning sup-
port, and it offers an opportunity during the reform 
process to make calibrations between individual deci-
sions and their effects on the intended goal of reform. 
The framing should moreover address a future-relevant 
issue, thus laying the groundwork for reform. In the 
context of migration policy, demographic change is a 
natural theme in this regard – thus, the constructive 
Formulating a clear reform objective (an increase in 
skilled labor immigration from third countries) and 
establishing a well-functioning strategy group are 
only the first challenges in a reform process. It is a far 
greater task to additionally win public support for or 
even develop appreciable momentum behind the goal. 
For large reforms, the public mood is naturally rather 
vague. There will be both support and opposition on the 
basis of individual interests, along with a certain overall 
reluctance in the face of too-substantial changes. No one 
wants to be among the losers of a reform process. And 
for individual groups, societal changes always pose the 
risk that public goods might be redistributed to their 
disadvantage. The topic of migration is in this regard 
particularly susceptible to blanket judgments, gener-
alizations and the articulation of fears over the loss of 
social status or affluence. 
In public debates, it is common for negative individ-
ual cases (e.g., unemployment-benefit abuses or pol-
iticians’ perks) to be represented as the rule, and for 
fundamental changes to be demanded on this basis. 
However, the topic of migration is particularly prone to 
broad-brush arguments of this kind, as – in addition to 
the above-noted factors – issues of cultural, religious 
and ethnic affiliation also play a role. Thus, fears that 
advantages for a foreign group (in this case, migrants, 
foreigners, Muslims, Roma or refugees, for example) 
could come at the expense of the majority, and are 
therefore unjust or to be viewed primarily with suspi-
cion, are a part of the landscape of debate. Therefore, 
the agenda-setting process – initiating public debate on 
the content of the reform with the aim of influencing 
opinion – is a much greater challenge for migration re-
form than would be the case in other reform projects. 
In addition, the political messaging that promotes 
and accompanies the reform should not supersede or 
take the place of the actual contents in the course of the 
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shaping of migration as an essential measure to achieve 
positive effects for prosperity and society that other-
wise threaten to dwindle as a consequence of the pop-
ulation’s aging. 
The focus on the utility argument is controversial 
among some migration policy actors, as it pushes the 
sociopolitical and humanitarian elements of migration 
policy into the background. But the fact is that fears of 
loss of social status and affluence are more pronounced 
than usual with the topic of migration, and thus the 
recourse to self-interested arguments promises greater 
success in terms of achieving a reform that ultimately 
should (and must) also encompass humanitarian, social 
and sociopolitical elements. However, these elements 
must not be allowed to be lost or negotiated away dur-
ing the reform process. This interpretation paradigm 
(“securing future prosperity and domestic peace”) will 
better protect the reform against culturally pessimistic, 
xenophobic and anti-modern arguments than if the re-
form is directly touted as a more progressive migration 
policy under the banner of “integration.” 
WHICH ASPECTS OF REFORMS SHOULD BE 
ADDRESSED FIRST?
The issue of demographic change has been in the public 
eye for some time; for this reason, it does not need to 
be newly reintroduced. In addition, it has the distinct 
advantage that it affects the lives of all population 
groups in one way or another: The issue encompasses 
the areas of work, social affairs, health care and long-
term care, housing, education, infrastructure and public 
services – all of which also play a substantial role in 
migration reform. Conversely, that means that avoiding 
the negative effects of demographic change will benefit 
all. The chain of argument establishing these connec-
tions runs as follows: 1) Demographic change threatens 
our prosperity, 2) thus we need migration, and 3) this 
must, however, be actively fostered through regula-
tions, structures and the social climate. Use of such an 
argument should diminish the politics of envy (who are 
the winners, and who the losers of reform) as well as 
anti-migration reflexes (“they’re taking something away 
from us”), as a successful reform will benefit not only 
migrants, but the entire population. 
During the course of the reform, actors must success-
fully pursue a balancing act, on the one hand promoting 
the reform goal of “more skilled foreign workers” and 
the various associated intermediate goals (see Figure 
1), and on the other continuously communicating the 
expected benefits of the reform to the public. Thus, 
the intermediate goal of “transparent and comprehen-
sible immigration rules” serves the subject heading 
of bureaucracy downsizing and better migration man-
agement, while the intermediate goal of “structurally 
anchoring a culture of welcome and recognition” by 
contrast serves to achieve a better customer orientation 
within public agencies, as well as better integration of 
all migrants living in Germany. Ideologically charged 
portions of the reform should be somewhat minimized 
from a communicative perspective, particularly with re-
gard to the third intermediate goal of “legal frameworks 
for long-term societal participation,” and thus ques-
tions of dual citizenship and anti-discrimination poli-
cies. Both are issues that can produce disproportionate 
amounts of opposition, but are nevertheless essential in 
order to bind skilled foreign workers to Germany over 
the long term and send all migrants a signal that they 
belong. 
WHAT IS THE RIGHT TIME TO ADVANCE THE 
ISSUE OF REFORM? 
For reform projects, it is easier if the population already 
perceives the need for action and a sense of urgency 
behind the reform exists, or alternately if there is a win-
dow of opportunity for a change in political course (for 
example, the one provided by the Fukushima catastro-
phe). Neither is currently the case for migration reform. 
The window of opportunity in this area is rather of a 
negative nature, which can be exaggerated and used for 
political purposes by right-populists and critics of mi-
gration (for example, attacks by youth in the subways, 
higher numbers of refugees, alleged abuse of social 
services, conflicts in socially deprived urban neighbor-
hoods). Pressure for action certainly exists, but is not 
sufficiently perceived as such by the public. 
This has a variety of causes. With the introduction of 
the EU Blue Card for immigrants from third countries 
at the same time as an increase in internal migration 
from EU countries, the previous federal government 
conveyed the impression that immigration rules were 
now sufficiently reformed and that current immigration 
levels were adequate. The EU Blue Card program’s low 
levels of success (2.500 Neuzuwanderer im ersten Jahr 
der Einführung; Expert Council 2014: 50) is also due to 
the fact that this diminishing of hurdles to immigration 
represents only the first step toward unified migration 
management. The management of immigration contin-
ues to lack clarity, and the remaining elements neces-
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sary to facilitate immigration – see the intermediate and 
action goals in Figure 1 – have largely not been pursued. 
The largely crisis-induced internal EU migration is only 
“loan” migration, which despite being viewed by the 
public as sufficient, will in fact do little to alter the long-
term situation. Only immigration from third countries 
can serve this latter purpose – however, third-country 
immigration as a share of total migration continues to 
fall short of expectations (see Table 2). 
Thus, it is necessary for reform actors to steadily 
build awareness of the issue, while always situating it 
within the context of demographic change, for example 
by discussing it in conjunction with the federal govern-
ment’s annual reports on long-term care or pension in-
surance. There are enough examples that the somewhat 
abstract topic of “the aging of society” can be translated 
into voters’ everyday life experiences: nursing short-
ages and costs, school closures, the disappearance of 
clubs and associations and the loss of crucial volunteers 
(such as firefighters), regional depopulation, and higher 
pension contributions in return for smaller pension in-
creases. These messages can be packaged together with 
the formula: “These are the consequences, if we don’t 
bring demographic change under control.” 
If reform actors are themselves to set the pace of 
public discussion and ensure that thematically relevant 
highlights are addressed, communication of the reform 
must be continuous and free of contradictions. The coa-
lition’s discipline is likely to be put to the test, particu-
larly if the CSU responds to right-populists’ attempts 
to mobilize against the reform, as they themselves are 
proponents of positions critical of migration. Here, re-
form actors must think at an early stage about compro-
mises that avoid undermining the reform project. The 
expedient of themselves acting in a manner critical of 
migration is not a solution. This is effectively letting the 
genie out of the bottle, so to speak – the spiral of outrage 
can be turned back only with difficulty, and in cases of 
uncertainty, protest voters critical of migration always 
vote for the “original,” which can always behave more 
shrilly and demand more than can the governing party. 
WHO IS THE TARGET AUDIENCE FOR 
COMMUNICATION OF THE REFORM? 
There is a minority in Germany – which should not 
be underestimated – of about 20 to 25 percent of the 
population that is hostile to migration, diversity and 
multicultural aspects of society, and which according-
ly supports the positions of the extreme right, the new 
right and the populist right, even if only a small propor-
tion actually votes for these parties (Decker, Kiess and 
Brähler 2014: 44). This share of the population will not 
be convinced of any migration reform that will funda-
mentally lead to more immigration. By contrast, there 
is a roughly equal share of the population that rejects 
xenophobic attitudes (Decker, Kiess and Brähler 2012: 
29 f.). These people presumably no longer need to be 
convinced of Germany’s future as a progressive coun-
try of immigration. The reform communication must 
therefore focus primarily on the remainder of the pop-
ulation – that is, those people who represent the broad 
spectrum of opinion on migration issues, from critical 
to favorable in its various gradations. It is the task of 
reform to win over this broad and ultimately not clearly 
defined middle. 
On closer examination, there are certain groups in 
which reform communication should explicitly take 
place: For instance, surveys regularly show that some-
what older people and people from rural or underdevel-
oped areas are more critical of migration. Similarly, me-
dium-sized businesses find it difficult to embrace ethnic 
and religious diversity (Köppel and Krislin 2008). Para-
doxically, these are the three groups that will be strong-
ly affected by the consequences of demographic change. 
Reform communication must be pursued here. The fore-
seeable negative consequences of demographic change 
for these groups must be addressed with reference to 
explicit real-life examples (see above), and linked with 
migration reform as a solution. In sum, this means 
identifying affected population groups and using sto-
rytelling elements to present the migration reform as 
a possible solution for impending future problems. The 
presentation should be neither abstract nor based whol-
ly on figures, but should rather be relevant to everyday 
life.
WHAT IS THE POTENTIAL POLITICAL RETURN 
FOR THE ACTORS INVOLVED? 
Without doubt, the sociopolitical aspects of a progres-
sive migration reform pose greater challenges for the 
conservative portion of the coalition – the CDU and the 
CSU – than for the Social Democrats. More migrant 
rights and more ethnic and religious diversity are not 
an obvious part of the Conservatives’ fundamental po-
litical convictions, and are indeed rejected by portions 
of their political base. A certain conflict of political val-
ues exists here, as employer and business associations, 
which are traditionally closer to the Conservatives, are 
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key drivers of the reform (see Figure 2). This is also true 
of municipalities with conservative governments that 
nevertheless demand solutions for the consequences 
of demographic change. It is therefore important in the 
context of migration reform to grant the conservative 
actors involved political successes, offering incentives 
for their support so they can go along with the project 
despite emotional distance from the reform goals – as 
long as the core of the reform is not put into question. 
This means that even progressive migration rules must 
sometimes be conservatively reinterpreted (instead of, 
as previously, conversely presenting restrictive migra-
tion rules as a positive innovation, such as casting lim-
itations on foreign-spouse reunification as a protection 
against forced marriages). Among the reform actors, 
the CSU could even take a role as a devil’s advocate or 
watchdog that respects the sensitivities of conserva-
tive circles. However, this will only work if the CSU is 
conscious of this role, and also supports the core of the 
reform. 
The CDU, which has engaged in a timid, more sym-
bolic than programmatic relaxation on migration issues, 
must as a major national party behave in a more states-
manlike manner than its Bavarian sister party. With mi-
gration reform that mutes the effects of demographic 
change, it has a single option: to be able to reconcile 
its core supporters (older people, rural populations, the 
medium-sized-business sector) with the issue of immi-
gration. The political base’s emotional distance from 
the topic can also be reduced insofar as the conserva-
tive reform actors emphasize that migration reform is 
ultimately the best path at all levels (see Figure 1) to 
make migrants into active citizens committed to Ger-
many, and to further reduce the integration problems of 
the past. However, this “political pathos” should remain 
non-partisan, and should not include cultural or ethnic 
elements. 
Individual reform actors should avoid taking on an 
ideologically charged profile. Examples from the Unit-
ed Kingdom and France have made the dangers of this 
clear: Prime Minister Gordon Brown publicly called in 
2007 for the development of a national motto that would 
express British national values, and the French gov-
ernment under President Nicholas Sarkozy launched 
numerous citizen forums in 2009 tasked with discuss-
ing national identity. Both experiments got out of con-
trol and had to be suspended, and ultimately helped 
push public opinion on immigration – particularly 
in France – further to the right. Ultimately, only the 
right-populists benefited from these campaigns (Wüp-
per 2010; Lyall 2008).
Naturally, the Social Democrats can more easily score 
political points through a grand-coalition migration re-
form; however, they too must take their labor wing into 
close consideration. Possible resistance from within the 
party may in this regard come more on labor-market pol-
icy grounds than from sociopolitical concerns. However, 
the introduction of a national minimum wage should 
mitigate this conflict to a substantial degree. With re-
gard to migration reform, the SPD is nonetheless reliant 
on the one hand on winning the support of the unions, 
who want to know how to protect their labor-market in-
terests; while on the other, the reform must be concep-
tualized and communicated so that migrants who are al-
ready in Germany (as well as municipalities with large 
numbers of migrants) will benefit. The reform should 
not produce a distinction between new and old migrants 
in the public eye. That would contradict the basic idea 
of an overall reform of immigration policy, as well as the 




6. FORMULATION AND DECISION MAKING: 
GROWING THE PIE, AND DISTRIBUTING IT FAIRLY
A broad-based migration reform would not survive this 
kind of negotiation. Thus, following the agreement in 
principle to work toward an increase in the number of 
skilled foreign workers as a reform objective (in order to 
mitigate the consequences of demographic change), it is 
necessary to be very clear internally with regard to the 
interests of individual reform actors and their associat-
ed interest groups. Reform actors should go through the 
individual intermediate and action goals (see Figure 1) 
and ask the following questions: Are the participating 
interests and the objectives targeted compatible? Can 
they be made compatible for the purposes of commu-
nication? Where can interest-driven changes be made 
without changing the core of the reform? What red lines 
exist, and how can other participants be compensated 
if the ability to reach intermediate goals is limited by 
these red lines? Examples of interests that play a role in 
shaping the reform may include the following: The CSU 
does not want to give right-populists an opportunity to 
raise their profile or political support; the CDU fears 
alienating its conservative base, and that new migrant 
voters may disproportionately support the SPD; the SPD 
is concerned that unions not be neglected in favor of em-
ployers’ interests, and that the long-term unemployed 
do not become the losers of the reform. 
All this taken together means that reform actors must 
build a relationship of trust with one another before the 
reform process begins. As a part of this, they must come 
to know and respect each other’s interests. And finally, 
all parties must be ready to participate actively and pro-
ductively in the implementation of the reform. Gaining 
political profile through the reform should be a common 
goal, not gaining profile at the expense of the reform or 
of other reform actors. It is above all the task of the strat-
egy group to keep these points in mind (see Section 4). 
The ability of the group’s collective composition to meet 
these requirements will also be tested. It is an advan-
The term “growing the pie” is used in negotiation the-
ory, and refers to the idea of an integrative approach to 
negotiation. In this regard, one does not focus primar-
ily on the position of the individual parties, but seeks 
rather to uncover the interests that lie behind these 
positions. Solutions are subsequently sought that meet 
these interests as far as possible. Thus, one does not ne-
gotiate in order to attain one’s own position in full, but 
rather to collectively consider all interests – thus grow-
ing the negotiation pie. This has the advantage that the 
climate of cooperation is strengthened, long-term coop-
eration becomes possible, and neither side begrudges 
the other’s successes. This contrasts with the classic ap-
proach to negotiation, in which various positions clash 
and the parties ultimately meet in the middle after both 
sides have made concessions. This comes down to finely 
argued details, and results in a compromise that leaves 
both parties unsatisfied (Spangler 2003). 
The compromise in the grand-coalition negotiations 
to abolish the Optionspflicht (the requirement that 
children of immigrants born in Germany ultimately 
choose a single citizenship) is a good example of such 
an outcome. The abolishment itself was first negotiated, 
settled and announced, only to have both sides fight 
afterwards about the meaning of the word “raised” in 
the negotiated text (“For children of foreign parents 
born and raised in Germany, the requirement to choose 
a nationality will in the future no longer be required 
[...]” “Shaping Germany’s Future” Coalition Agreement 
2013: 105) The draft law since enacted likely pleases 
neither side, and also has the problem of administra-
tive expenses, while failing to solve the problem of 
provisional naturalization. This was primarily a matter 
of minimizing the political successes of the other side 
through the details, and not of solving an outstanding 
problem or establishing a common understanding of the 
problem and the underlying interests.
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tage that the other primary drivers of reform – munici-
palities and business associations (see Section 2) – have 
a foot in both government camps, and thus represent a 
unifying rather than divisive element. 
Despite the helpful framework conditions – the 
grand coalition has a majority government, the public 
is aware of demographic change as a future challenge, 
the reform drivers are not deepening the gap between 
the two political camps, and European directives favor a 
progressive migration policy – the CDU/CSU must over-
come more emotional hurdles and political risks than 
the SPD if the reform is to do more than simply modify 
what has come before. In the end, a reform of this mag-
nitude can be societally grounded and can win broad 
public acceptance only through consistent, conserva-
tive participation. The alternative is a political trench 
warfare that goes on for decades and discourages actors 
from tackling the challenges posed by migration. For the 
Conservatives, constructive participation in a migration 
reform project offers the opportunity to be perceived as 
an authentic modern major party (Volkspartei), and to 




7. IMPLEMENTATION: THE CORRECT SEQUENCE 
ENSURES A SMOOTH START FOR REFORM 
existing laws, which are moreover limited to the fed-
eral level. This intermediary target will appear rather 
abstract in the public eye. Of course, internal (and as 
appropriate, external) expertise must initially be called 
upon here, and the public administration must be com-
pelled to reformulate the regulations to correspond with 
the overall tenor of the reform. The primary task will be 
to shape the early reform communication so as to send a 
positive signal to the public (as well as abroad); lacking 
this, opposition among potential reform opponents can 
rapidly form. In this stage, it is to the benefit of the re-
form that the business associations, as key institutional 
drivers, have a strong interest in this intermediate goal, 
and can be involved in this phase of the reform as effec-
tive public advocates. 
If the first intermediate goal is for the most part a 
legislative and communicative challenge, the second – 
nationwide, unitary settlement services – is a complex 
mix of fine-tuning of substantive administrative func-
tions (the type and extent of settlement services, along 
with their coordination) and negotiation processes at 
multiple levels, as the Länder, the level at which these 
services are provided, will be involved to a significant 
degree (responsibility for settlement services, agree-
ment on uniform standards, approval in the Bundesrat). 
In addition, an increased level of financial resources will 
be needed for the implementation of this intermediate 
goal. Thus, negotiations between the reform actors and 
the representatives of the federal states on cost-sharing 
and the legal framework for uniform service standards 
should begin as soon as possible, ideally in parallel with 
implementation of the first intermediate goal. 
Rapid progress is important, as the first tangible re-
sults should follow the public formulation of the new 
immigration regulations in order to prevent the reform 
process’s implementation and external communication 
from stalling. For example, opening the first welcome 
After reform actors have agreed on reform goals, the 
agenda and opportunities for political return, imple-
mentation begins. A reform of this magnitude cannot 
be accomplished in a single step. An approach employ-
ing multiple, in part parallel phases of different lengths 
(corresponding to the three intermediate goals: trans-
parent immigration rules, structural anchoring of a 
culture of welcome, and a legal framework for societal 
participation) has a number of advantages: The actors 
involved can determine the sequence of intermediate 
goals, and thus provide for a smooth start for the reform 
process, so that initially the abstract, then the tangible 
and resource-intensive, and finally the most controver-
sial intermediate goals are implemented. In addition, 
the various institutional reform drivers and allies can 
be used to help achieve the different intermediate goals 
according to their specific influence and interests. Fi-
nally, those elements of the reform that continue to be 
the source of disagreement between the reform actors 
can in this way be postponed. The longer the actors 
successfully pursue the reform process together, thus 
building trust and creating a common public image, the 
easier it will be at the end to resolve the remaining dif-
ferences of opinion.
WHAT ARE THE IMPLEMENTATION 
CHALLENGES, AND IN WHAT ORDER SHOULD 
THE REFORM GOALS BE ADDRESSED? 
The three intermediate goals generate different finan-
cial and political costs, and the individual reform ele-
ments should be timed accordingly. The establishment 
of transparent immigration regulations produces the 
least amount of costs, and their implementation re-
quires the least effort of all three intermediary goals. 
This largely entails a unification and simplification of 
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centers for migrants in a number of large cities would 
represent a forward step for the reform process that was 
both visible on a personal level and easily communicat-
ed to the media. Moreover, the sooner this phase of the 
reform begins, the sooner the reform actors can expect 
useful results while they are working on the third in-
termediate goal (see Figure 2). It is to be assumed that 
an agreement will be achieved only after a somewhat 
protracted period of time. Here, the municipal associa-
tions should be used as reform drivers in order to win 
the support of relevant stakeholders at the federal-state 
level for the reforms. Regardless of their success, the 
federal government will have to make financial conces-
sions – ultimately, the Länders’ acquiescence with the 
reforms will also be a question of funding. 
The third intermediate goal – long-term societal 
participation – is no more difficult with regard to 
administrative implementation than the development 
of transparent immigration regulations, but for the 
participating reform actors it involves the highest 
political costs of any of the intermediate goals. Under-
lying this goal are measures such as the expansion 
of anti-discrimination policy, an easing of family reuni-
fication rules, more rapid naturalization and the accept-
ance of dual citizenship – all elements that meet with 
significant reservations among portions of the public 
as well as in the conservative government camp. There 
is no general sense that these are necessary steps in 
a migration reform in order to secure the reform ob-
jective in a long-term and sustainable way. Yet without 
them, Germany will bind only a small share of the new 
immigrants to itself over the long term, and will be 
unable to facilitate coexistence within an increasingly 
diverse population without producing unnecessary ten-
sion. 
An additional problem is the difficulty in measuring 
the effects engendered by this intermediary goal. The 
first intermediary goal increases the number of immi-
grants, the second eases practical burdens for local 
authorities, but the positive societal effects of the third 
intermediate goal, such as the development of a sense 
of belonging or self-perception as a full-fledged citizen, 
are largely intangible, and come into being only after 
a relatively long interval. Although the majority of mi-
gration researchers consider the above-noted elements 
to be necessary for a modern society of immigration, 
some political actors regard them as dispensable, or 
even fight actively against their implementation. Higher 
naturalization or family reunification figures are good 
signs that immigrants feel at home in Germany. How-
ever, these relatively easily collected indicators are of 
only limited use in convincing the public of the positive 
effects of migration reform, as they relate to controver-
sial areas within the current migration debate. Moreo-
ver, there are no external stakeholders able to serve as 
strong institutional drivers for this intermediate goal. 
Foundations and socially oriented NGOs working in this 
area do not have the same degree of political influence 
Figure 2: Sequence and start of implementation of the individual intermediate goals 
Intermediate goal 1: Transparent immigration regulations 
Intermediate goal 2: Structural anchoring of a culture of welcome
Intermediate goal 3: Legal framework for societal participation
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as industry associations, unions or municipal umbrella 
associations. 
If the reform is to succeed, reform actors need to 
have the political will to overcome resistance even with-
in their own ranks and their own voter base. One pos-
sibility is a detour to the EU level. In Section 1, it was 
made clear that the European Union has developed into 
a major determining factor in migration policy, regard-
less of whether governments have fulfilled directives 
only reluctantly, or – as in other policy areas (internal 
security, for example) – have injected themselves into 
European decision making processes in order to bypass 
national resistance. 
The examples of the General Equal Treatment 
Act (AGG) and the EU Blue Card show that important 
milestones in German migration policy have been im-
plemented without prior political debate, and out of 
the public eye. This was done on purely pragmatic 
grounds, as the actors were required to implement the 
legal changes on the basis of EU directives, and to the 
extent possible wanted to avoid being too aggressively 
associated with a policy that did not in fact fit with their 
political agenda. This approach could also benefit 
reform actors with regard to the still-contentious 
aspects of the reform, as they could initially advocate 
for the idea in general terms, but without communi-
cating details, in order to avoid provoking opposition 
within their own ranks. This would enable some of the 
reform actors to save face, and provide them with the 
opportunity to promote the changes after their imple-
mentation and reinterpret them according to their own 
convictions. 
In this regard, the European Union is not only a 
key determinant of migration policy, but also offers an 
opportunity for action at a moment at which the reform 
project may have been stalled by national actors. Reform 
skeptics can in this way be integrated into the process, 
insofar as they can be offered a European solution that 
soothes their fears of adverse consequences from the 
reform, or which better serves their interests. It may 
therefore be useful to allow certain elements of the 
reform to enter German policy in the context of EU 
directives, taking advantage of the EU as a stepping 
stone. Regardless of this approach’s advantages, how- 
ever, any effort to depart at the national level from the 
realities of the migration-policy framework (free move-
ment of persons and the equal treatment of all EU cit-
izens) specified by the EU will meet with no success. 
European-level processes and decision making struc-
tures are too complex and too lengthy to yield any such 
outcome. 
WHAT ELEMENTS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN 
ONGOING REFORM COMMUNICATION?
Public communication around the reform begins by 
associating the reform with the overarching issue of 
demographic change (see Section 5). The second step 
is regular communication of the various successes in 
the context of the intermediate goals (for example, an 
increase in the number of skilled immigrant workers, 
the utilization of welcome centers, or an increase in 
the naturalization rate), accompanied by narrative ele-
ments that make the issue more tangible for members 
of the public (for example, profiles of new immigrants, 
descriptions of everyday experiences in a welcome 
center, naturalization ceremonies), and information 
on positive impacts for the rest of the population (for 
example, the medium-sized-business sector increases 
its production levels and creates more jobs in a region; 
schools in sparsely populated regions no longer have to 
close; people’s own older relatives receive better care; 
vacant rural physician positions can be once again filled 
more easily). The third step – the creation of a general 
positive public sentiment that welcomes immigration 
beyond its economic necessities – is the most difficult. 
At first glance, this seems to contradict the economic 
argument for reform centered on demography and the 
demand for skilled workers. However, it is fundamental 
for the implementation of the third intermediary goal, 
and also to prevent a distinction being made in the pub-
lic debate on migration between supposedly economi-
cally “useful” and “less useful” migrants. This distinc-
tion would neither be conducive to societal acceptance 
of ethnic diversity, nor help close the emotional distance 
between current migrants and the remainder of the pop-
ulation. Both are prerequisites for a successful society 
of immigration, however. Here, the reform communi-
cation must perform the tricky balancing act of high-
lighting the utility of immigration for Germany without 
making it appear that migrants are simply instruments 
for combating economic shortages, rather than fellow 
citizens who will help shape the county’s future. 
Right-populist and right-conservative opponents of 
the reform will attempt to steer the public debate with 
cultural arguments – thus, not directly opposing immi-
gration management, but instead demanding that only 
migrants that are in their view culturally compatible 
with Germany be allowed to immigrate. Attempts to 
quell discussion of this kind do not work (and taking up 
these putative concerns, thus strengthening the anti-re-
form argument further, is certainly of no use). The re-
form actors should argue that Germany has experienced 
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and is experiencing continuous social change, and that 
cultural selection criteria can thus never be adequate to 
the social reality, and are moreover not generally appli-
cable to whole ethnic groups. 
In addition, the discussion should not hinge on what 
allegedly defines Germany currently or in the past, but 
rather on what kind of society we want to be in the 
future; thus, not about whether and which migrants 
supposedly suit Germany, but how we as a modern so-
ciety of immigration can make all migrants active and 
self-identified citizens. Arguments about cultural dif-
ferences will no longer play a significant role when a 
societal consensus on equality of opportunity and par-
ticipation exists without regard to ethnic origin. 
HOW SHOULD THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN 
REFORM ACTORS AND CITIZENS BE SHAPED? 
The subject of migration can develop a destructive mo-
mentum among the public if changes are not made care-
fully and with clear consideration for the interests of the 
citizens affected (or those who feel they are affected). 
The 2013 protests against the planned refugee-applicant 
housing in Berlin-Hellersdorf are just one example in 
which right-wing extremists were able to use the local 
population’s frustration in order to poison the public 
debate (Roth 2013). A public dialogue is altogether im-
portant, and even essential for a reform project of this 
magnitude in order to convince the undecided; however, 
a few points must be considered in this regard. Reform 
actors should seek to avoid triggering a general discus-
sion of migration, foreigners or identity – this simply 
invites actors critical of migration to hijack the agenda, 
and the entire discussion will ultimately be dominated 
by prejudices that make reform seem impossible. The 
example of France cited in Section 5 shows the inability 
to control such debates. 
Where the reform issue is abstract, it should also 
be argued on an abstract and technical level, as in the 
case of immigration management, annual immigration 
figures or the expected economic benefits. Where the 
population is directly affected, the real expected chang-
es should be discussed with reference to the local level, 
for instance in neighborhoods with high proportions of 
new migrants, in areas where settlement services are 
established, or with locals seeking work in regions with 
a shortage of skilled workers. In areas where emotions 
can run high, as with the topics of dual citizenship or 
discrimination, reform actors should introduce emo-
tionally positive counter examples into the controlled 
debate, thus sketching the above-noted image of a mod-
ern German future as a kind of blueprint for the migra-
tion reform. This approach can prevent communicative 
failures associated with conducting emotional debates 





8. ONGOING PERFORMANCE MONITORING:  
KEEPING THE REFORM ON TRACK
reform’s course from other reform actors, the partic-
ipating political parties and their voter bases, so that 
potential new or reemerging conflicts can be identi-
fied at an early stage. 
These are challenges that in sum demand an enormous 
expenditure of oversight effort. The capabilities of the 
strategy group’s task force will likely be stretched to 
their limits. One solution may be to supplement this 
body with a monitoring unit located within one of the 
primary participating federal ministries. On substan-
tive grounds, the natural choice for this would be the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. This would also 
conform with a broadly held opinion among migration 
researchers, who have argued in favor of a central point 
of coordination for migration policies that to date have 
been fragmented across the federal government, prefer-
ably in this non-security-policy-oriented ministry (Kotte 
2013). 
This need is even greater for the implementation of a 
migration reform intended to increase the immigration 
of skilled workers. Following completion of the reform, 
it would be especially useful to combine responsibility 
for migration policy at a single point, thus avoiding put-
ting the success of the reform at risk by retaining these 
distributed responsibilities. However, as is mentioned 
in the case study for the 2005 immigration reform, 
structural issues are also power issues, and the contents 
of reform face the danger of being blocked on principle 
if they are perceived as posing a threat to ministerial 
or political influence. A potential fourth intermediate 
goal of “combining responsibilities for migration policy 
within a single state institution” would thus be desira-
ble, but should not be an official part of the reform so 
as to avoid endangering the reform as a whole. During 
the reform, it must be seen whether the monitoring unit 
and the strategy group’s executive body are the basis 
The foregoing sections outlined the individual building 
blocks of reform (intermediate goals) that will be im-
plemented in various areas and in different order. Once 
initiated, these strands of reform must be reviewed by 
the strategy group over their entire period of implemen-
tation, progress and impact – thus amounting to an on-
going performance monitoring. The individual strands 
of reform are:
 · The continuous communication, adapted to the indi-
vidual intermediary goals and the specific affected or 
interested target groups, and with the involvement of 
the relevant reform drivers; 
 · Negotiations with those actors that are not among 
the actual reform actors, but who are necessary for 
implementation – thus, the Länder/local authorities 
in the case of settlement services, the Bundesrat for 
laws that require its approval, or additional federal 
ministries/agencies that will be involved only with 
individual elements of the reform; 
 · The changes in laws and regulations in accordance 
with the reform – thus, the national administration, 
in a unified process of organized legislative prepa-
ration, formulates the foundations for the individual 
intermediary goals with an eye toward legal require-
ments and outcomes, taking into account the inter-
nal subject-area knowledge within the participating 
reform actors; 
 · The implementation of practical intermediary goals 
in accordance with the reform – thus, that the ad-
ministrative bodies tasked with implementing the 
reform, such as settlement services and the visa au-
thorities, exemplify the idea of a culture of welcome, 
particularly when working with migrants; 
 · The measurement of the effects and impact of imple-
mented intermediate goals, and monitoring to ensure 
that they conform to the overall spirit of the reform;
 · The process of giving and obtaining feedback on the 
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for a development that can ultimately lead to a concen-
tration of responsibility in a single state office. Howev-
er, whether this eventually comes to pass is a political 
decision. 
The ongoing performance monitoring of the individ-
ual strands of reform will moreover be overshadowed 
by an ambivalence that results from the reform’s time 
frame: the tension between authentic reform narrative 
and quantifiable performance reports. After the first 
reform steps, a considerable time will pass before a 
certain fixed number of skilled foreign workers have 
immigrated and also chosen Germany as a new perma-
nent home. The time lag between initial reform costs 
and the later outcome of reform is generally a problem 
for actors who are subject to election cycles. This effect 
is intensified in the case of migration, because conflicts 
or disaffection related to migration are short-term and 
locally visible (changes in the neighborhood), while the 
benefits remain abstract and appear more generally 
over the middle and long term (creative potential and 
economic growth). It is thus of vital importance to com-
municate that the migration reform is just as prolonged 
and potentially difficult to grasp as – for instance – de-
mographic change, the consequences of which it will 
serve to moderate. It must be made clear: There are chal-
lenges and problems that we must come to grips with. 
This (reform) journey has the ultimate goal of changing 
the future – and that will take time to accomplish. 
This admittedly rather vague statement of course 
stands in contrast to the release of quantifiable perfor-
mance reports, which should substantiate the positive 
course of the reform. They should be made available and 
communicated as soon as possible, as testimony to the 
reform’s impact. Now the process, which began with the 
establishment of a clear reform objective (increase in 
immigration among skilled workers), has come full cir-
cle. However, it will take some time until, for example, 
the number of work permits issued to skilled foreign 
workers in professions with skills shortages noticeably 
rises, the increase in foreign students and the share of 
those remaining in the country can be registered, or the 
population decline as compared to the years of the re-
form’s beginning is attenuated. These are all examples 
of how the quality of the migration reform’s outcomes 
might be illustrated, in addition to the utilization of wel-
come centers or the rise in naturalization figures men-
tioned in Section 7 (ongoing reform communication). 
Ultimately, additional indicators must be developed 
in the course of the reform process to verify and illus-
trate the effects of the implemented elements of reform. 
This should include a state instrument that as far as 
possible ascertains or brings up to date the demand for 
skilled labor, and makes this transparent as part of the 
reform-communication framework. In general, owing 
to the broad spectrum of reform communication, this 
whole constellation of issues can also be described as 
a kind of expectations management (among the public 
and the reform actors). From the overall narrative to the 
success of individual measures to the goal of reform it-
self, the big picture can be sketched and the reform’s 
progress demonstrated with the help of individual, 
smaller steps. 
However, it is not sufficient simply to initiate the in-
dividual elements aimed at achievement of the interme-
diate goals, and subsequently measure the outcomes. 
The intermediate step – appropriate implementation 
by the relevant administrative bodies – must also be 
monitored. It has become apparent that it is precisely 
in the interface between the administration and citizens 
(or customers) that steps are not always implemented 
in accordance with the legislators’ intent regarding a 
new law or regulation (Greive 2014).The expansion of 
settlement services and anti-discrimination measures 
should not take place simply on paper, but must effec-
tively bring about change in the sense of a new service 
orientation, regardless of the responsible institution or 
funding source. Otherwise, the outcomes will always 
fail to meet expectations. The monitoring unit can de-
termine the need for further adjustments through sur-
veys of target groups or external reports, and integrate 
the findings thus acquired into the reform process. A 
good example of an impact assessment in this area is 
the current study “Wirkungsanalyse des rechtlichen 
Rahmens für ausländische Fachkräfte” (BMWi 2014, 






9. SUMMARY CONCLUSION:  
A MIGRATION POLICY FOR GERMANY’S FUTURE
that should be seized: The ideological trench wars of the 
1980s and 1990s have subsided, Germany is stable and 
enjoys relative prosperity, ethnic and religious diversity 
is an obvious feature of German society and right-wing 
populism – unlike that seen in other parts of Europe – is 
not a nationwide movement. It is worth hoping that the 
current German government will take advantage of the 
present opportunity to overhaul migration policy and 
pursue consistency in migration legislation. This is no 
easy task, but it is also entirely feasible. The findings of 
the migration reform outline presented here are summa-
rized below and are designed to help those tasked with 
undertaking such a reform.
1. Migration reform must be comprehensive in its de-
sign. This is required of any reform that is intend-
ed not only to bring an end to the fragmentation of 
competences and responsibilities but also to cover 
all aspects of a modern migration policy. Economic 
arguments provide effective leverage in winning pub-
lic support for migration regulations, but migration 
policy will run aground if it is not accompanied by 
sociopolitical measures and services. 
2. The reform must have a clearly defined, verifiable ob-
jective that can be understood. It must also feature 
structured elements (intermediate and action goals) 
that target the main goal and address all aspects of 
migration policy. “Increasing the number of immi-
grant skilled workers” is, for example, a main goal 
and “establishing transparent immigration regula-
tions, structurally anchoring a culture of welcome, 
and creating a legal framework for societal participa-
tion” are three intermediate goals that can be target-
ed (for details, see Section 3, Figure 1). 
3. Participating reform actors – in this case Germany’s 
current grand coalition members – must believe in 
and agree on the purpose and goal of the reform.
4. Implementing the reform requires a strategy group 
Despite oft-cited references to “predictions are tricky, 
particularly with regard to the future,” forecasts are 
nonetheless developed in many policy areas in the 
hopes that we not only learn from past experience but 
improve decision making by basing it on accurate in-
formation. The contribution presented here follows this 
logic but also bears a double burden: It not only outlines 
the potential contents of a migration policy for Germa-
ny, it also plans for this contingency from the perspec-
tive of those actors needed to implement such a policy, 
even though they have yet to determine the necessity of 
migration reform.
Germany’s current migration policy is better than 
its reputation would suggest. It has improved over the 
last 20 years, though this has been an arduous process 
marked by its own contradictions. Any improvements 
made have been driven less by a commitment to making 
migration policy “fit for the future” than by the need 
to respond to a changing reality in Germany. These im-
provements can also be attributed in part to the benefits 
associated with Germany’s integration into the Euro-
pean Union. Nonetheless, the migration policy debate 
in Germany continues to languish under self-critical 
navel-gazing at the cost of finding effective policy solu-
tions. As a result, Germany’s migration policy fails to 
seize present opportunities and – even worse – live up 
to Germany’s self-proclaimed standards as a modern, 
pluralistic society at the heart of Europe. Establishing 
a forward-looking and active migration policy that an-
ticipates challenges rather than relying on a policy ma-
chinery that responds ad hoc to problems is part and 
parcel of such standards. Indeed, to date, Germany has 
failed to embed migration policy within a fully coherent 
strategic framework.
Policymakers’ fears of overwhelming the public with 
a massive reform are understandable. Nonetheless, we 
are presented with a unique window of opportunity 
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whose members have the political expertise and 
clout to act as a command center in planning the re-
form, organizing the requisite know-how, resolving 
internal conflicts, negotiating with external actors 
and pushing forth a reform communication strategy 
that is appropriate to each stage in the process of 
implementation. Ideally, this strategy group would 
include the ministers of labor and the interior, the 
heads of the Federal Employment Agency and the 
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees and repre-
sentatives from the chancellor’s office. 
5. The reform must be embedded within a broader 
agenda that does not necessarily emphasize the is-
sue of migration but, rather, highlights the advantag-
es of migration for German society as a whole. This 
is important if policymakers wish to avoid or at least 
take the wind out of hostile knee-jerk responses and 
attempts to mobilize against immigration. The issue 
of demographic change identified here offers one 
such broad agenda that is an appropriate context in 
which to pursue the migration reform outlined here. 
6. Reform actors should seek to raise their profile 
through the reform and its achievements (and they 
should also be provided opportunities to raise their 
political profile) but not at the cost of the reform or 
other actors. 
7. The implementation of individual reform steps 
should be sequenced in such a way as to ensure suc-
cess. In other words, begin by stating abstract goals, 
follow this with the local implementation of tangible 
reforms and then take up the politically controver-
sial goals. In order to ensure the visibility of reform 
outcomes, external actors involved with carrying out 
specific reform elements (Länder/municipalities) 
should be brought into the process as early as possi-
ble and also the financing of reforms should be clari-
fied early on. 
8. In order to ensure widespread public support for the 
reform, drivers and supporters of reform (employers’ 
associations, municipal umbrella organizations, in-
ternal party working groups, NGOs working on mi-
gration and human rights issues, settlement services 
providers) should be involved in implementing indi-
vidual reform elements and in accordance with their 
individual interests. 
9. The reform must be accompanied by an ongoing 
communication strategy that is fine-tuned for each 
step along the way – whether this involves commu-
nicating an abstract, formal aspect or the local im-
plementation of a reform. The communication strat-
egy should target those on the fence as well as those 
groups directly affected by the reform. When possi-
ble, the advantages of the reform should be linked 
directly with the real-life examples of individuals.
10. In parallel with each phase of the reform process, the 
strategy group should track progress made with the 
help of a monitoring unit. In addition to measuring 
the specific impact of each measure along the way, 
monitoring should involve ensuring whether or not 
the overall tenor of the reform is met by the admin-
istrative units responsible for implementation. A tool 
that helps calculate needs assessment for specific 
aspects of migration policy (e.g., calculating the ex-
act number of skilled workers needed) would also be 
of considerable use. Finally, in order to prevent con-
flicts or premature frustration from taking hold, ex-
pectations among participating reform actors should 
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